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In Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ultimately rejected the 
concept of transformative use having a central role within 
the doctrine of fair use. In doing so, the Seventh Circuit 
broke with judicial precedent, namely the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., where the 
Court unanimously held that the inquiry for the first factor 
of fair use is whether, and to what extent, the work is 
transformative. The Seventh Circuit’s 2014 decision raises 
questions about the scope of the holding in Campbell and 
about whether this holding extends to cases outside of the 
realm of parody. 
This Article will examine the scope of Campbell and 
whether there can still be market-centered fair use post-
Campbell. This Article will then consider the implications 
of a market-centered fair use analysis. Finally, this Article 
will conclude that courts should continue to utilize the 
transformative use inquiry for the purposes of fair use, that 
Congress need not intervene in fair use, and that there 
cannot be market-centered fair use post-Campbell. 
 
  
                                                                                                             
* Aaron B. Wicker, American University Washington College of Law, 
Class of 2016. For their continued guidance and support during this process, I 
thank my family. For their valuable comments, I am grateful to Professor 
Victoria Phillips, Professor Peter Jaszi, and the editors of the Washington 
Journal of Law, Technology & Arts. 
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Fair use, a doctrine of copyright law in the United States, is an 
important instrument for the promotion of culture and innovation 
in our society. This doctrine is an affirmative defense against 
claims of copyright infringement that protects secondary 
creativity.1 While fair use has been recognized in common law 
since the Statute of Anne of 1709,2 it was not statutorily codified 
until the Copyright Act of 1976 (the “Copyright Act”).3 The statute 
sets out four non-exclusive factors to determine whether a fair use 
has been made: 
 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the 
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality 
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon 
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.4 
 
In the years immediately following the enactment of the 
Copyright Act, fair use was characterized by uncertainty.5 Fair use 
jurisprudence was wrought with the application of inconsistent 
principles and divided courts.6 In the 1980s, the Supreme Court 
endorsed the idea that commercial uses are presumptively unfair in 
back-to-back fair use opinions.7 In Harper & Row Publishers v. 
                                                                                                             
1 See Pierre N. Leval, Toward A Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
1105, 1110 (1990) (stating that the fair use doctrine protects secondary creativity 
as a legitimate concern of copyright). 
2 See, e.g., Gyles v. Wilcox, (Ch. 1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (recognizing that 
“fair abridgement” does not infringe an author’s rights). 
3 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). 
4 Id. 
5 See Leval, supra note 1, at 1106 (stating that judges did not share a 
consensus on the meaning of fair use). 
6 See id. at 1106–07 (“Reversals and divided courts are commonplace.”). 
7 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 
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Nation Enterprises, the Supreme Court proclaimed that the fourth 
factor is “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair 
use.”8 These judicial proclamations made it exceptionally unlikely 
that any use that was commercial in nature would qualify as fair 
use, and installed the inquiry into market harm as the dominant 
paradigm in any fair use analysis.9 
Following a law review article by Pierre N. Leval10 and a 
Supreme Court decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,11 
however, a new strand of fair use jurisprudence arose in the early 
1990s. In Campbell, the Supreme Court found that the inquiry for 
the first fair use factor focuses on whether, and to what extent, a 
work’s new use is transformative.12 The Supreme Court further 
elaborated that “the more transformative the new work, the less 
will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that 
may weigh against a finding of fair use.”13 Importantly, the 
Supreme Court corrected the Sony dictum that commercial uses are 
presumptively unfair.14 
Following Campbell, the circuit courts widely adopted the 
transformative use inquiry.15 In a recent opinion, Kienitz v. Sconnie 
                                                                                                             
(1984) (“[E]very commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an 
unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the 
copyright.”); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 
562 (1985) (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 451). 
8 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562. 
9 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 715, 722 (2011) (commenting that under the market-centered paradigm 
it was very unlikely that any use deemed “commercial” would qualify as fair 
use). 
10 See Leval, supra note 1, at 1111 (noting that the question of justification 
should turn on whether and to what extent the use is transformative). 
11 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
12 Id. at 569. 
13 Id. 
14 See id. at 594 (“It was error for the Court of Appeals to conclude that the 
commercial nature of 2 Live Crew’s parody of ‘Oh, Pretty Woman’ rendered it 
presumptively unfair.”). 
15 See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 255 (2d Cir. 2006) (“We have 
applied Campbell in too many non-parody cases to require citation for the 
proposition that the broad principles of Campbell are not limited to cases 
involving parody.”). 
4
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Nation,16 however, the Seventh Circuit criticized the Second 
Circuit’s use of transformativeness in its Cariou v. Prince 
decision,17 rejected the transformative use paradigm, and split from 
the majority in its treatment of fair use. In Kienitz, the Seventh 
Circuit suggested that the fourth factor was the most important of 
those enumerated in 17 U.S.C. § 107 and used a market-centered 
approach to fair use in its analysis.18 This contrasts with the typical 
analysis used by courts when utilizing the transformative use 
paradigm, which is driven by the first factor.19 
This Article will address the scope of the holding in Campbell 
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., as well as the scope of transformative 
use. Furthermore, this Article will seek to provide a detailed 
description of the implications that transformative use has had and 
explain that the Seventh Circuit broke from an important legal 
precedent in its rejection of transformative use. Moreover, this 
Article seeks to explain the implications of taking the market-
centered approach that the Seventh Circuit offered most recently in 
Kienitz. In light of the Seventh Circuit’s recent holding, this Article 
will argue for transformative fair use and assert that there should 
no longer be market-centered fair use. 
Part I of this Article examines the development of fair use, 
beginning with Pierre Leval’s Toward a Fair Use Standard and its 
vast impact on fair use jurisprudence in the last two decades. It will 
then move on to the opinion in Campbell and how courts have 
applied its holding. More specifically, the section will look at the 
application of transformative use to appropriation art by the 
Second Circuit in Cariou. Following this, Part I will examine the 
Seventh Circuit’s treatment of transformative use in Kienitz. 
Part II begins by analyzing the two cases in question in order to 
determine what influenced each decision. The section demonstrates 
how the two standards can render different outcomes when applied 
                                                                                                             
16 Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014). 
17 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). 
18 Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758. 
19 See Jason M. Nolan, The Role of Transformative Use: Revisiting the 
Fourth Circuit’s Fair Use Opinions in Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens, 16 VA. J.L. 
& TECH. 538, 555 (2011) (stating that transformativeness is dispositive of fair 
use). 
5
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to the same factual scenario. To demonstrate that the application of 
each case’s inquiry has different results, this Article applies the 
different fair use standards to a hypothetical artist named Ronald 
Woratx. 
Part III argues that there is still no need for congressional 
intervention in 17 U.S.C. § 107. This Article suggests that the 
Campbell decision offers a solution to fair use that best promotes 
the goals of copyright law, following two decades of more 
consistent outcomes and a more widely available defense. Part III 
also notes that the market-centered approach taken by the Seventh 
Circuit contradicts the goals of copyright law by narrowing the 
availability of the fair use defense and in turn stifles the promotion 
of both culture and innovation. It explains how the development of 
the transformative use paradigm has benefitted fair use immensely 
by creating a more uniform standard, which the Seventh Circuit 
should have followed. The section concludes that the 
transformative use paradigm is a beneficial interpretation of fair 
use and that it is a clear standard which reflects the original intent 
of both the fair use doctrine and copyright law. 
 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSFORMATIVE FAIR USE 
 
Part A provides an overview of the transformative use 
paradigm from an influential law review article to a critical 
Supreme Court decision. Part B examines the application of 
transformative use by courts after Campbell and the trends of fair 
use jurisprudence of the last two decades. Part C directly addresses 
the decision in Cariou. Finally, Part D examines the Kienitz 
decision and its criticism of Cariou, as well as the transformative 
use paradigm. 
 
A.  From Leval to Campbell: The Creation of the Transformative 
Use Paradigm 
 
Pierre Leval’s 1990 law review article, Toward a Fair Use 
Standard, has had a tremendous impact on modern fair use 
6
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jurisprudence.20 Leval published the article following a period of 
inconsistency, divided courts, and reversals that marked the fair 
use jurisprudence of the 1980s.21 The article was where the term 
“transformative use” was first coined.22 In the article, Leval argues 
that courts should look to the intention of copyright law, 
maintaining that it serves a utilitarian purpose.23 In particular, 
Leval suggests that courts should look toward the purpose of fair 
use, which is to ensure that copyright protection is not so 
expansive to stifle creativity.24 Perhaps most importantly, Leval 
reasons that courts should look to “whether, and to what extent, the 
challenged use is transformative” in determining whether the first 
factor of 17 U.S.C. § 107 merits a finding of fair use.25 Leval 
asserts that the soul of fair use is the first factor.26 The article 
maintains that transformative use can take a multiplicity of forms 
and notably not just parody.27 
Leval goes on to argue that transformative use should trickle 
into a third factor analysis as well—specifically, that courts should 
look to the amount and substantiality of a use in order to determine 
whether there was in fact a transformative use.28 Notably, the 
article discourages courts from relying too heavily on the fourth 
factor, which would severely cripple fair use.29 
In 1994, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in Campbell that 
                                                                                                             
20 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) 
(citing Pierre N. Leval, Toward A Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 
1110 (1990)). 
21 See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 
429 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev’d, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 
(1984); see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 
1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), modified, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev’d, 471 U.S. 
539 (1985). 
22 See Leval, supra note 1, at 1111 (“I believe the answer to the question of 
justification turns primarily on whether, and to what extent, the challenged use is 
transformative.”). 
23 Id. at 1118. 
24 Id. at 1109. 
25 Id. at 1111. 
26 Id. at 1116. 
27 See generally id. 
28 Id. at 1122–03. 
29 Id. at 1124–05. 
7
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echoed much of the philosophy Leval advocated in his article.30 
Campbell has since become arguably the most important Supreme 
Court fair use decision.31 
Campbell addressed a parody of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty 
Woman” by well-known rap artists 2 Live Crew.32 The Campbell 
Court found that a parody may be a fair use pursuant to § 107.33 
More importantly, however, the Court found that for the first 
factor: 
 
[T]he enquiry focuses on whether the new work 
merely supersedes the objects of the original 
creation, or whether and to what extent it is 
“transformative,” altering the original with new 
expression, meaning, or message. The more 
transformative the new work, the less will be the 
significance of other factors, like commercialism, 
that may weigh against a finding of fair use.34 
 
This seemed to follow the standard set out for transformative use 
in Leval’s article.35 This opinion sparked a wave of new fair use 
jurisprudence and brought life to transformative use as the 
dominant consideration in fair use analysis.36 
  
                                                                                                             
30 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (quoting Pierre N. Leval, Toward A Fair Use 
Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990)). 
31 See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose: Justice Souter’s 
Rescue of Fair Use, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19, 19 (1994) (expressing 
joy that Justice Souter’s opinion guided the fair use doctrine in the right 
direction). 
32 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 571–72. 
33 Id. at 579–80. 
34 Id. at 569.  
35 See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use 
Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 604 (2008) (“The Campbell 
court relied heavily on the concept of transformativeness and on Judge Leval’s 
exposition of it in its first factor analysis of 2 Live Crew’s parody.”). 
36 Id. 
8
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B.  Application of Campbell by the Courts: The New Jurisprudence 
of Fair Use and the Development of a More Uniform Standard 
 
Following Campbell, circuit courts began to apply the 
transformative use paradigm.37 Over time, the doctrine grew 
widespread. For example, in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corporation, the 
Ninth Circuit considered whether thumbnails used by a search 
engine could be considered a fair use.38 The court reasoned that the 
thumbnails did not supersede the original photographs’ use and 
that they were transformative because they served a different 
purpose from the original photographs.39 This opinion applied the 
transformative use inquiry to a case involving search engine 
thumbnails—a far cry from parody—and broadened the scope of 
Campbell.40 
Similarly, in Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd., 
the Second Circuit considered whether a chronological assemblage 
of reduced-format posters in a biography of the Grateful Dead 
titled Illustrated Trip constituted a fair use.41 The court found that 
each poster differed from its original expressive purpose due to the 
bibliographic nature of the book, and accordingly was 
transformative.42 This case broadened Campbell by holding that 
even when a secondary user takes an entire work, the use can still 
be considered transformative, so long as the use does not supersede 
the original.43 
In recent years, transformative use has increasingly become a 
                                                                                                             
37 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 255 (2d Cir. 2006) (“We have applied 
Campbell in too many non-parody cases to require citation for the proposition 
that the broad principles of Campbell are not limited to cases involving 
parody.”). 
38 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 
39 Id. at 819. 
40 See generally id. (applying transformative use to search engine 
thumbnails). 
41 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 
2006). 
42 Id. at 609. 
43 Id. 
9
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more uniform standard amongst the circuit courts.44 For example, 
the Second Circuit has cited Ninth Circuit decisions in recent 
opinions,45 and consequently outcomes have become more 
predictable.46 Circuit courts have interpreted Campbell broadly, 
and such opinions have not been limited to parody cases.47 Cases 
such as Kelly and Bill Graham demonstrate that a use can be 
transformative if the secondary use serves some new purpose, even 
when the secondary user did not materially alter the original 
work.48 Kelly and Bill Graham are cases about removing images 
from their original contexts, shrinking them, and using them in 
alternate contexts while still recognizing them as their original 
items. Blanch v. Koons is an artistic case about taking images from 
a copyrighted work, altering those images, and incorporating those 
altered images into a new whole.49 Blanch, like Kelly and Bill 
Graham, supports the view that transformative use is fundamental 
to determining fair use. Further, Blanch reinforces that 
transformative use is primarily about new purposes.50 
In Blanch, the Second Circuit found that appropriation art 
                                                                                                             
44 See Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47, 49, 51 
(2012) (showing that findings of transformative use can be used to predict likely 
outcomes of fair use cases). 
45 See Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2014); see 
also Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 217 (2d Cir. 2015). 
46 See Netanel, supra note 9, at 736. 
47 See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 255 (2d Cir. 2006) (“We have 
applied Campbell in too many non-parody cases to require citation for the 
proposition that the broad principles of Campbell are not limited to cases 
involving parody.”). 
48 See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (holding that using images of posters and tickets used in a book about 
the Grateful Dead was a fair use); see also Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 
811 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a search engine using thumbnail images was a 
fair use). 
49 See Blanch, 467 F.3d at 253 (noting that the defendant’s use of the 
copyrighted work involved “changes of its colors, the background against which 
it is portrayed, the medium, the size of the objects pictured, the objects’ details  
. . . as part of a massive painting commissioned for exhibition in a German art-
gallery space”). 
50 See id. at 252 (“The sharply different objectives that Koons had in using, 
and Blanch had in creating, ‘Silk Sandals’ confirms the transformative nature of 
the use.”). 
10
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could serve a transformative purpose.51 An appropriation artist 
named Jeff Koons created a painting entitled “Niagara,” in which 
he appropriated a photograph taken by Andrea Blanch.52 Blanch’s 
photograph depicted a woman’s lower legs and feet in a pair of 
glittery Gucci sandals, decorated with bronze nail polish, which 
rested on a man’s lap.53 Koons appropriated only the legs and feet 
from the photograph for his painting, excluding the background of 
the man’s lap.54 Koons then changed the orientation of the feet 
from a 45-degree angle to a vertically inverted position.55 Koons 
also added a heel to one of the feet and modified the coloring of 
the photograph.56 The photograph was included in the painting 
along with three other pairs of feet and lower legs dangled over 
images of confections as well as a grassy field and the Niagara 
Falls in the background.57 
Relying on Campbell, the court applied a transformative use 
inquiry to the first statutory factor.58 The court reasoned that 
Koon’s purposes in using Blanch’s photography were quite 
different from Blanch’s goals in creating it.59 Blanch had created 
her photograph for publication in an American lifestyles magazine, 
while Koons used the image as part of a large-scale painting for a 
German museum.60 Furthermore, Koons wanted “the viewer to 
think about his/her personal experience with these objects, 
products, and images and at the same time gain new insight into 
how these affect our lives.”61 Koons wanted to “show some sort of 
erotic sense [;] . . . to get . . . more of a sexuality to the 
photographs.”62 
The Blanch court did not believe that the mere fact that Koons’ 
                                                                                                             
51 See id. at 259 (holding that appropriation art can be transformative). 
52 Id. at 247–48.  





58 Id. at 251. 
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work was a painting and Blanch’s work was a photograph was 
enough to support a finding of fair use, nor that Koons’ work was 
in a museum and Blanch’s was in a magazine to be sufficient.63 In 
keeping with Kelly and Bill Graham, the court needed to find “new 
expression, meaning, or message” from the secondary use.64 As 
such, the Blanch court pointed to Ringgold v. Black Entertainment 
Television, Inc. where a copy of a painting was used as decoration 
for a television program’s set.65 In particular, the court noted that 
the Ringgold court found that the secondary use served the same 
decorative purpose as the original and accordingly was not 
transformative.66 
Further, regarding the amount and substantiality of the 
selection used, the Second Circuit found that the amount that 
Koons took was “reasonable in relation to the purpose of the 
copying.”67 Koons only took the legs, feet, and sandals from the 
original photograph, and excluded the background.68 More 
importantly, Koons excluded many of the creative decisions made 
by Blanch.69 
Recent empirical studies suggest that when a new work is 
found to be transformative, the statutory factors are essentially 
replaced by transformative use. While opinions do still incorporate 
by reference all of the considerations in the statute,70 the inquiry 
                                                                                                             
63 See id. (“Koons does not argue that his use was transformative solely 
because Blanch’s work is a photograph and his a painting, or because Blanch’s 
photograph is in a fashion magazine and his painting is displayed in museums. 
He would have been ill advised to do otherwise.”). 
64 Id. at 251 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 
579 (1994)). 
65 Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 79 (2d Cir. 
1997). 
66 Blanch, 467 F.3d at 252. 
67 Id. at 257. 
68 Id. at 258. 
69 Id. 
70 Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1525, 1564 (2004) (“[T]he facial emptiness of the statutory 
language means that alone, it is almost entirely useless analytically, except to the 
extent that it structures the collection of evidence that a court might think 
relevant to its decision.”). 
12
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has effectively been reduced to two prongs.71 In A Pattern-
Oriented Approach to Fair Use, Michael Madison demonstrates 
that courts have recognized certain patterns of practice utilized by 
social and professional groups, such as the idea that journalism, 
education, and comparative advertising deserve fair use 
recognition.72 Madison’s research reveals that courts have typically 
found uses to be fair when they find that a defendant is engaged in 
one of these patterns.73 Similarly, in Predicting Fair Use, Mathew 
Sag establishes that findings of transformative use tend to precede 
findings of fair use.74 Additionally, in Making Sense of Fair Use, 
Neil Netanel shows that transformative use has replaced inquiry 
into harm to an actual or potential market as the dominant 
paradigm in fair use doctrine.75 Netanel demonstrates that courts 
almost always find uses to be fair when they find the use of a 
copyrighted work to be transformative. His conclusion shows that 
the fair use inquiry has narrowed to two prongs: whether a use has 
a transformative purpose, and whether amount of copyrighted 
material used was appropriate to that purpose.76 
To this end, modern courts typically disregard the fourth factor 
if the use is transformative.77 The only market effects that are 
relevant in fair use analysis are those that result from consumer 
substitution. In Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., an authoritative 
recent decision, the Second Circuit opined that: 
 
 
                                                                                                             
71 See Netanel, supra note 9, at 768 (“If the use is for a transformative 
purpose, then the question is whether the defendant has copied more than a 
reasonable amount for that purpose.”). 
72 Madison, supra note 70, at 1646–47. 
73 See id. at 1645–46. 
74 See Sag, supra note 44, at 49, 51. 
75 See Netanel, supra note 9, at 742. 
76 See id. at 743, 745–46. 
77 See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 613 
(2d Cir. 2006) (recognizing that copyright owners are not entitled to control the 
“transformative markets” for their works); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994) (“[W]hen, on the contrary, the second use 
is transformative, market substitution is at least less certain, and market harm 
may not be so readily inferred.”). 
13
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The more the appropriator is using the copied 
material for new, transformative purposes, the more 
it serves copyright’s goal of enriching public 
knowledge and the less likely it is that the 
appropriation will serve as a substitute for the 
original or its plausible derivatives[ . ]78 
 
In other words, highly transformative uses have a lower risk for 
market harm because they are not serving the original work’s 
intended market. 
 
C.  Cariou: A Broadening of Transformative Use? 
 
In Cariou v. Prince, the Second Circuit held that a new work 
need not comment on the original in order to be transformative.79 
The court found that a new purpose and a different audience were 
sufficient for a finding of fair use.80 In this case, the Second Circuit 
again considered whether a fair use defense could be applicable to 
appropriation art.81 Patrick Cariou, a professional photographer, 
brought a copyright infringement action against a well-recognized 
appropriation artist, Richard Prince, for his use of Cariou’s 
copyrighted photographs of Rastafarians and Jamaican 
landscapes.82 Appropriation art by definition involves directly 
taking an object or another existing work of art and placing it into 
a new work of art.83 In this case, Prince included Cariou’s 
photographs into his new works of art. Prince had previously stated 
that in his work he “completely tr[ies] to change [another artist’s 
work] into something that's completely different.”84 
The Second Circuit found that Prince’s use of Cariou’s 
photographs was, in fact, transformative in twenty-five out of his 
                                                                                                             
78 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 214 (2d Cir. 2015). 
79 See id. at 706–07. 
80 See id. at 706, 709. 
81 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706–07 (2d Cir. 2013). 
82 Id. at 706, 709. 
83 Id. at 699. 
84 Id. 
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thirty paintings and constituted a fair use.85 The court relied 
heavily on Leval’s article and Campbell in its decision and gave 
great weight to the fact that the paintings were transformative 
when concluding that a fair use was made.86 
The court went on to hold that Prince’s work could be 
transformative, notably without commenting on Cariou’s 
photographs and in the absence of any defense from Prince 
suggesting that he intended to comment upon or criticize Cariou’s 
work.87 The court held that the photographs were transformative 
because Prince’s work employed new aesthetics and had an 
entirely different audience than Cariou’s work.88 The court found 
that Prince’s paintings had a new expression and a new 
communicative result. Accordingly, the first factor weighed in 
favor of Prince because his work was transformative.89 
The Second Circuit then cascaded transformativeness across 
the other three statutory factors.90 For the fourth statutory factor of 
§ 107, the court held that the inquiry is whether the new work 
completely usurps the market for the original, and that the more 
transformative the new work, the less likely it is that it does so.91  
This broadened treatment of transformative use across statutory 
factors, as well as the court’s rejection of the requirement of 
commentary, considerably extended the fair use doctrine 
previously employed in other circuits. 
 
D.  Pushing Back: The Seventh Circuit Rejects Transformative Use 
 
Following Cariou, Harvard Law Review published an article 
criticizing the Second Circuit’s analysis in the case and asserting 
that the definition of transformative use adopted by the Second 
Circuit was the broadest to date.92 This definition, the article 
                                                                                                             
85 Id. at 694. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 707. 
88 Id. at 708–09. 
89 Id. at 708. 
90 Id. at 708–09. 
91 Id. at 709. 
92 See Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, Copyright Law — Fair Use — Second Circuit 
Holds that Appropriation Artwork Need Not Comment on the Original to Be 
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argues, is in tension with the definition of derivative works in 17 
U.S.C. § 106 of the Copyright Act.93 The article is primarily 
critical of the Second Circuit’s holding that new work need not 
comment on the original in order to be transformative.94 
Additionally, it seems to suggest that there remains some 
uncertainty as to whether the holding in Campbell should be 
limited to the genre of parody.95 
In Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, the Seventh Circuit issued 
the first circuit-level critique of Cariou and, more broadly, of 
transformative use. In its opinion, the court cited some of the same 
concerns of the foregoing article.96 
The issue before the Seventh Circuit in Kienitz was whether a 
fair use was made where a copyrighted photograph of Paul Soglin, 
mayor of Madison, Wisconsin, was turned lime green, used to 
make t-shirts and tank tops along with the words, “Sorry for 
Partying,” and sold by Sconnie Nation on clothing for a marginal 
profit.97 The Seventh Circuit found that a fair use was made of 
Kienitz’s photographs.98 More interesting than the outcome, 
however, was the court’s analysis. In the opinion, Judge 
Easterbrook held that transformative use was not a statutory factor 
and that it is better to adhere to the four factors listed in § 107.99 
Easterbrook then proceeded to emphasize that: 
 
The Second Circuit has run with the suggestion and 
concluded that “transformative use” is enough to 
                                                                                                             
Transformative. — Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013), 127 HARV. L. 
REV. 1228, 1229 (2014). 
93 See id. at 1232 (stating that the Second Circuit’s definition of 
transformative is in direct tension with the derivative work right); see also 17 
U.S.C. § 106. 
94 Id. at 1228. 
95 See id. at 1232; cf. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 255 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(“We have applied Campbell in too many non-parody cases to require citation 
for the proposition that the broad principles of Campbell are not limited to cases 
involving parody.”). 
96 See Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014) (stating 
that transformative use is in tension with the derivative work right). 
97 Id. at 757. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 758. 
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bring a modified copy within the scope of § 107. 
See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d 
Cir. 2013). Cariou applied this to an example of 
“appropriation art,” in which some of the supposed 
value comes from the very fact that the work was 
created by someone else. 
 
We’re skeptical of Cariou’s approach, because 
asking exclusively whether something is 
“transformative” not only replaces the list in § 107 
but also could override 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), which 
protects derivative works. To say that a new use 
transforms the work is precisely to say that it is 
derivative and thus, one might suppose, protected 
under § 106(2). Cariou and its predecessors in the 
Second Circuit do not explain how every 
“transformative use” can be “fair use” without 
extinguishing the author’s rights under § 106(2).100 
 
This last passage follows some of the concerns of the Harvard 
Law Review article, specifically with regard to § 106 derivative 
works and the holding that certain appropriation art is a fair use.101 
Further, the Seventh Circuit maintained that the fourth factor, 
market effect, should be the most important in a fair use 
analysis.102 The opinion went on to look at fair use through an 
economic lens, relying on whether the allegedly infringing work 
was a complement to, or a substitute for, the original work.103 
Ignoring whether Sconnie Nation’s work could be considered 
transformative, the Kienitz court held that, because a shirt or tank 
top is not a substitute for the original photograph, a fair use can be 
                                                                                                             
100 Id. 
101 See id. (asserting that transformative use is in direct tension with the 
derivative work right); see also Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, supra note 92. 
102 Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758 (“We think it best to stick with the statutory list, 
of which the most important usually is the fourth.”). 
103 See id. at 759 (“A t-shirt or tank top is no substitute for the original 
photograph.”). 
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made in such contexts.104 
Kienitz is significant in that it seemingly rejects the fair use 
jurisprudence developed after Campbell. While the opinion 
specifically criticizes Cariou and the Second Circuit, both the 
language and analysis are dismissive of transformative use as a 
whole. It thus hearkens back to pre-Campbell fair use decisions by 
placing most of the weight of the statutory analysis on the fourth 
factor.105 
 
II. TRANSFORMATIVE FAIR USE: AN ISSUE? 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s approach in Kienitz is problematic for a 
number of reasons. Not only does the opinion seemingly ignore the 
entirety of the fair use jurisprudence of the 1990s and 2000s, but it 
also diminishes the Supreme Court’s holding in Campbell.106 
Instead, the opinion puts great weight on the fourth factor of § 107 
analysis.107 
Placing such weight on the fourth factor does great harm to the 
availability of fair use.108 In the words of Leval, “[b]y definition 
every fair use involves some loss of royalty revenue because the 
secondary user has not paid royalties.”109 One of the greatest 
benefits of the new fair use jurisprudence has been that it has made 
the doctrine more widely available.110 A thriving fair use defense is 
                                                                                                             
104 Id. 
105 See id. at 758 (“We think it best to stick with the statutory list, of which 
the most important usually is the fourth.”). 
106 See id. (“The district court and the parties have debated whether the t-
shirts are a ‘transformative use’ of the photo—and, if so, just how 
‘transformative’ the use must be. That’s not one of the statutory factors, though 
the Supreme Court mentioned it in Campbell.”). 
107 See id. (holding that the fourth statutory factor is usually the most 
important). 
108 See Leval, supra note 1, at 1124–25 (“[I]f an insubstantial loss of 
revenue turned the fourth factor in favor of the copyright holder, this factor 
would never weigh in favor of the secondary user. And if we then gave serious 
deference to the proposition that it is ‘undoubtedly the single most important 
element of fair use,’ fair use would become defunct.”). 
109 Id. at 1124. 
110 See Sag, supra note 44, at 79 (maintaining that focusing on the character 
of the use rather than the identity of the user makes the defense available to 
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paramount to accomplishing one of copyright law’s foremost 
goals: the promotion of culture and innovation.111 
The following hypothetical exemplifies some of the differences 
between the circuit split and ideally will highlight some of the 
problems with the Seventh Circuit’s approach to fair use in Kienitz: 
A professional photographer, Jessica Smith, takes several 
photographs of New Zealand landscapes and Mäori people 
performing haka. The photographs are then published in a book 
entitled Yes Haka. 
A recognized appropriation artist, Ronald Woratx, then 
incorporates the photographs into a sequence of paintings and 
collages. The original photographs are blown up in size, acrylic 
paint is added, the photographs are then superimposed along with 
photographs of various technologies not taken by Smith onto a 
piece of sheet metal. A major news network quotes Woratx in an 
interview: “I wanted to explore information-age propaganda and to 
get the viewer to think about their personal experience with it.” 
Gallery A is putting on a show. The owner contacts Smith 
about potentially incorporating some of her photographs from Yes 
Haka into the show. Gallery B is showing several of Woratx’s 
works in another show, including his pieces that incorporate 
photographs by Smith. The owner of Gallery A learns of Woratx’s 
pieces being shown at Gallery B and then attempts to contact 
Smith. Smith does not respond and the gallery owner concludes 
that Smith is collaborating with Woratx and is not interested in the 
exhibition at Gallery A. The owner of Gallery A then decides not 
to feature any of Smith’s pieces from Yes Haka in the show. 
 
A.  Transformative Fair Use: A Second Circuit Analysis Would 
Likely Support a Finding of Fair Use Because Woratx’s 
Secondary Use Was Transformative 
 
Following the new and more unified jurisprudence of 
transformative fair use, a court would likely find that a fair use was 
                                                                                                             
commercial actors and that the doctrine is more predictable that one might 
think). 
111 See Leval, supra note 1, at 1107 (maintaining that the observance of fair 
use is necessary to achieve the objectives of copyright law). 
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made of Smith’s photographs. This school of jurisprudence has 
placed the first factor—whether the use was transformative in 
nature—at the center of the analysis.112 Although first established 
in Campbell, two decades of case law have narrowed it to focus 
primarily on whether the purpose of the use was transformative in 
nature.113 Following this paradigm, courts would then look to the 
amount of the original work taken and whether it was appropriate 
to the purpose of the secondary use.114 Cariou took the first prong 
of this inquiry a step further, holding that a new work need not 
comment on the original in order to be transformative.115 This new 
fair use jurisprudence created a more uniform articulable standard 
by simplifying the analysis to the foregoing two prongs.116 
Thus, a court would typically begin its transformative use 
analysis by examining the first factor: the purpose and character of 
the use.117 In Campbell, the Supreme Court found that the inquiry 
for the first factor is whether and to what extent the work is 
transformative.118 The circuits have interpreted this inquiry to 
focus on the extent to which the purpose is transformative.119 
Professor R. Anthony Reese surveyed thirty-seven circuit court 
opinions, ranging from the decision in Campbell in 1994 to 
                                                                                                             
112 See Sag, supra note 44, at 55 (“According to Campbell, 
transformativeness not only occupies the core of the fair use doctrine but also 
reduces the importance of all other factors such that ‘the more transformative the 
new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, 
that may weigh against a finding of fair use.’”). 
113 See R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work 
Right, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467 (2008) (“[I]n evaluating transformativeness 
the courts focus more on the purpose of a defendant’s use than on any alteration 
the defendant has made to the content of the plaintiff’s work.”). 
114 See Netanel, supra note 9, at 745 (“Under the transformative use 
paradigm, factor three—the amount of the copyrighted work that the defendant 
has used—becomes a question not of whether the defendant took what is the 
most valuable part of the plaintiff’s work (as it was under the market-centered 
paradigm), but rather whether the defendant used more than what was 
reasonable in light of the expressive purpose driving the transformative use.”). 
115 See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). 
116 See Sag, supra note 44. 
117 Leval, supra note 1, at 1105. 
118 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–79 (1994). 
119 See Nolan, supra note 19, at 554 (stating that courts have found purpose 
to be dispositive of transformativeness). 
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2007.120 In thirty-one cases, transformativeness was expressly 
addressed in the first-factor analysis.121 Reese’s study revealed 
that: 
 
In all of those opinions, when the court found that 
the defendant had a transformative purpose for her 
use, the court found that the transformativeness 
inquiry weighed in favor of fair use, regardless of 
whether the court viewed the defendant as having 
transformed the actual content of the plaintiff’s 
work in any way. Indeed, in all of the cases where 
transformativeness was found based on the 
defendant’s transformative purpose, the opinion’s 
ultimate conclusion was that the use was, or was 
likely to be, fair.122 
 
Following the above reasoning, the court would consider 
whether the purpose of Woratx’s use of Smith’s photographs was 
transformative. The application of this reasoning to the Woratx 
scenario would begin by looking at whether the secondary use 
serves a transformative purpose. The court would likely find such 
transformativeness because Woratx’s secondary use serves a 
distinctly different purpose. Smith’s photographs were created for 
a traditional book on the Mäori people and their culture. Woratx 
sought to express an idea about the modern world by using Smith’s 
photograph as part of a large-scale collage about information-age 
propaganda. This difference in the purposes of these works would 
likely weigh in favor of a finding that the use was transformative. 
Next, the court would examine the amount of the original work 
taken and consider whether it was appropriate to the purpose of the 
secondary use.123 In the Woratx scenario, the photographs taken by 
                                                                                                             
120 Reese, supra note 113, at 471. 
121 Id. at 471. 
122 Id. at 485. 
123 See Netanel, supra note 9, at 745 (“Under the transformative use 
paradigm, factor three—the amount of the copyrighted work that the defendant 
has used—becomes a question not of whether the defendant took what is the 
most valuable part of the plaintiff’s work (as it was under the market-centered 
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Smith were part of a large-scale collage along with several other 
photographs and a sheet metal background. Accordingly, the 
amount taken is likely proportional to the amount needed to 
accomplish the purpose of the secondary use.124 
Based on this two-prong approach, the court would likely find 
that Woratx made a fair use of the photographs and, accordingly, 
Woratx would not be held liable for copyright infringement. 
 
B.  Market-Centered Fair Use: A Seventh Circuit Analysis Would 
Likely Hold Woratx Liable for Copyright Infringement Because 
the Works Are Substitute Goods 
 
Applying the recent Seventh Circuit jurisprudence of fair use, 
however, the court would likely find Woratx liable for infringing 
Smith’s photographs. The effect of this jurisprudence has been to 
place the fourth factor at the center of the analysis and to inquire 
whether the use constituted substitutional or complementary 
copying within the original’s market.125 
The application of this analysis to the Woratx scenario would 
begin by looking at whether the secondary use was substitutional 
or complementary. The focal point of this analysis is whether the 
copying harms the market value of the original work. In the 
Woratx scenario, Woratx created a collage that was to be exhibited 
in art galleries. Smith took photographs that had potential to be 
displayed in an art gallery. In this scenario, in fact, when a gallery 
owner heard that Woratx’s work was being displayed in a gallery 
she decided to no longer pursue an exhibit with Smith’s 
photographs. According to the logic in Kienitz, this fact would 
weigh against a finding of fair use because Woratx’s appropriation 
                                                                                                             
paradigm), but rather whether the defendant used more than what was 
reasonable in light of the expressive purpose driving the transformative use.”). 
124 See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 252 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that 
because Koons only took the legs, feet, and sandals from the original 
photograph, excluding the background and excluded many of the creative 
decisions made by Blanch, the copying was reasonable in relation to the 
transformative use). 
125 See Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(“We have asked whether the contested use is a complement to the protected 
work (allowed) rather than a substitute for it (prohibited).”). 
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of Smith’s photographs harmed the market value of her 
photographs by costing her an opportunity at a museum exhibit by 
virtue of being a substitute for the photographs. Woratx’s 
appropriation of Smith’s photographs would thus be unlikely to 
constitute a fair use under the Seventh Circuit’s approach to fair 
use. 
 
C.  Assessing the Kienitz Decision: Should There Be Market-
Centered Fair Use? 
 
Prior to Campbell, one of the mistakes of fair use precedent 
that Judge Leval lamented most was the inappropriate weight 
given to the market effect of a copyrighted work.126 Leval 
accurately pointed out that all instances of fair use inherently 
involve certain market effects because, at a minimum, the author of 
the original work would be missing out on royalties.127 Placing too 
much weight on this factor has the effect of stifling the availability 
of fair use, which in turn can have the effect of stifling secondary 
creativity.128 
The Seventh Circuit’s fair use analysis in Kienitz hearkens 
back to a time when courts designated the fourth factor as central 
to a finding of fair use.129This approach is problematic for two 
reasons. First, it ignores a highly influential Supreme Court 
decision. Campbell overturned prior fair use precedent by 
decentering the fourth fair use factor and placing the first factor in 
the center of the inquiry. The opinion in Kienitz completely 
disregards this by stating that transformative use is “not one of the 
statutory factors, though the Supreme Court mentioned it in 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.”130 Campbell did not simply 
mention transformative use, but rather installed it as the central 
                                                                                                             
126 See Leval, supra note 1, at 1125 (stating that if we treat the fourth factor 




129 See Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 
(1985) (“[T]he last factor is undoubtedly the single most important element of 
fair use.”). 
130 Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758. 
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inquiry in cases involving fair use.131 The Campbell test has been 
central to fair use case law since it was decided.132 It has created a 
more uniform standard that, in turn, has increased the availability 
of fair use.133 The Seventh Circuit should not have brushed this 
aside. 
Second, and perhaps the most problematic aspect of Kienitz, is 
the Seventh Circuit’s attempt to revive a market-driven approach 
to fair use.134 This is precisely what Leval urged courts to avoid.135 
While the fourth factor is important, it should not eclipse the 
requirement of justification under the first factor.136 Although a 
secondary use may not impair the market value of the original one, 
it does not necessarily follow that the secondary use is justified.137 
A party should still need to demonstrate that the purpose of the use 
was transformative and that the amount taken was proportional in 
relation to that purpose. Such reasoning is supported by the basic 
goal of copyright law, which is to stimulate progress in the arts for 
the benefit of the public. Fair use is meant to protect secondary 
creativity.138 All intellectual creativity is in some sense 
derivative.139 Authors and other artists do not simply start from 
scratch. Instead, they build on past ideas. Fair use recognizes this 
                                                                                                             
131 See Beebe, supra note 35, at 605 (“[I]n those opinions in which 
transformativeness did play a role, it exerted nearly dispositive force not simply 
on the outcome of factor one but on the overall outcome of the fair use test.”). 
132 See Netanel, supra note 9, at 736 (“During 2006–2010, 85.5% of district 
court opinions and 93.75%, or all but one, of appellate opinions considered 
whether the defendant’s use was transformative.”). 
133 See Sag, supra note 44 (stating that fair use outcomes are more 
predictable and consistent than commonly assumed); see also Beebe, supra note 
35, at 566 (stating that unpredictability in fair use may cause defendants to 
settle). 
134 See Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758 (maintaining that the fourth factor is usually 
the most important and that transformativeness is not a statutory factor). 
135 Leval, supra note 1, at 1125 (“[I]f we then gave serious deference to the 
proposition that it is ‘undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use,’ 
fair use would become defunct.”). 
136 Id. at 1124. 
137 See id. (“The fact that the secondary use does not harm the market for 
the original gives no assurance that the secondary use is justified.”). 
138 Id. at 1110. 
139 Id. at 1109. 
24
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 11, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol11/iss4/5
2016] MUCH ADO ABOUT TRANSFORMATIVENESS: 379 
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT AND MARKET-CENTERED FAIR USE 
process as an inherent and important aspect of innovation.140 
The Campbell test better aligns with this important aspect of 
innovation. An inquiry into whether the purpose of a use is 
transformative, rather than simply whether the market of the 
original is harmed, better ensures that the use is of the sort that fair 
use is designed to protect. While market effect should be 
considered in a finding of fair use, to place it as the central element 
of fair use would be a misstep by the courts. 
 There has been some concern, illustrated by the Kienitz court, 
that transformative use may potentially override 17 U.S.C. § 
106(2), which protects derivative works.141 This concern, however, 
is misguided. Derivative works, by definition, involve 
transformation.142 The meaning of “transform” for the purposes of 
§ 107, however, is distinctly different from the meaning of 
“transform” for the purposes § 106. In examining the relationship 
between transformative fair use and the derivative work right, a 
study by R. Anthony Reese found that courts: 
 
[I]n evaluating fair use, generally disregard whether 
the defendant has created a derivative work. In 
assessing transformativeness, the courts generally 
emphasize the transformativeness of the defendant’s 
purpose in using the underlying work, rather than 
any transformation (or lack thereof) by the 
defendant of the content of the underlying work.143 
 
Reese concluded that U.S. appellate courts have so far “not applied 
fair use transformativeness in ways that significantly implicate the 
scope of the copyright owner’s derivative work right.”144 
Congress intended for fair use to be a doctrine with the ability 
                                                                                                             
140 Id. 
141 Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014). 
142 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one 
or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, 
dramatization . . . or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed 
or adapted.”). 
143 Reese, supra note 113, at 484–85. 
144 Id. at 467. 
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to adapt and evolve.145 The Campbell test has given the doctrine 
new life and brought it out of the darkness of the market-centered 
paradigm used throughout the 1980s. The Seventh Circuit’s 
rejection of Campbell not only contradicts Supreme Court 
precedent, but also fails to consider congressional intent. 
 
III. A DEFENSE OF TRANSFORMATIVE USE: THE NEED FOR A 
CONSISTENT STANDARD 
 
In light of the foregoing analysis, courts should continue to 
follow a transformative use approach in fair use cases. At the heart 
of any discussion of fair use should be the goals of copyright law 
and the objectives that fair use seeks to accomplish. Copyright law 
aims to increase the progress of knowledge and creativity by 
providing a special reward—the monopoly of a copyright—to 
artists.146 This individual reward, however, is given to serve a 
utilitarian purpose:147 to benefit the public with “the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts.”148 The fair use doctrine works 
synergistically with these goals based on the idea that “excessively 
broad protection would stifle, rather than advance, the 
objective.”149 A thriving fair use right is vital to the progress of 
culture and intellectual creativity. 
Since Campbell, the development of a more uniform standard 
has increased the availability of fair use dramatically.150 This is 
                                                                                                             
145 See H.R. REP. 94–1476, at 66 (1976) (“[There is no disposition to freeze 
the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological 
change.”). 
146 Leval, supra note 1, at 1108. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
149 Id. at 1109. 
150 See Netanel, supra note 9, at 735 (“[U]nder the market-centered 
paradigm, fair use is available only when reasonable copyright holders would 
consent to the defendant’s use and others like it but are prevented from doing so 
due to the prohibitively high costs of negotiating for such a license.”); see also 
id. at 768 (stating that under the transformative use paradigm “if the use is 
transformative and the defendant has not copied excessively in light of the 
transformative purpose, the use will most likely be held to be a fair use even if 
the copyright holder might enter or already has entered a licensing market for 
similar uses, and indeed even if the copyright holder would have been willing in 
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beneficial. Fair use’s present position provides the benefit of 
predictability for recognized fair uses, such as parody, and of 
flexibility when it comes to cases of first impression. This allows 
fair use to adapt to new technologies and the times. 
The adoption of the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Kienitz by 
other district courts would be detrimental to the fair use doctrine. 
To maintain uniformity, the Seventh Circuit should uphold the 
standard set out by the Supreme Court in Campbell. At present, 
practitioners would have to prepare an entirely different argument 
for fair use in the Seventh Circuit than anywhere else in the United 
States. 
Furthermore, the standard embraced by the Seventh Circuit in 
Kienitz, which places the fourth factor at the heart of the analysis, 
will too often cause a fair use plea to lose.151 Cases involving 
value-added uses, which are nevertheless public and commercial in 
nature, will always be present in the courts. If such cases were to 
lose out from an approach that focused on the fourth factor, the 
public would lose out on the benefit of such innovation. This 
contradicts what the fair use doctrine was intended to 
accomplish.152 
While some discrepancies will always exist regarding a fair use 
analysis,153 rejecting a standard ubiquitous amongst the rest of the 
circuit courts is a different matter. The transformative fair use 
jurisprudence has served to empower the doctrine, resulting in 
more predictability, and is more closely aligned with the goals of 
copyright law. Fair use has evolved greatly over the last two 
decades and to revert to a pre-Campbell market-centered fair use 
analysis would be to regress back to a less consistent, weaker fair 
use defense. Accordingly, courts should disregard Kienitz’s larger 
implications and continue to use a transformative fair use 
                                                                                                             
principle to license the use in question”). 
151 Leval, supra note 1, at 1125 (stating that if we treat the fourth factor as 
the single most important element of fair use, fair use will become defunct). 
152 Id. at 1110 (maintaining that fair use is meant to protect secondary 
creativity as a legitimate concern of copyright). 
153 Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1267 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(holding that a nonprofit educational use may weigh in favor of a finding of fair 
use under the first factor, even when nontransformative). 
27
Wicker: Much Ado about Transformativeness: The Seventh Circuit and Market
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2016





The decision in Kienitz would significantly impact the fair use 
landscape for secondary users of creative works if widely adopted. 
Congress intended fair use to promote secondary creativity and 
recognized it as a valid policy goal of copyright protection.154 With 
multiple standards and less predictability, the result could stifle 
secondary creativity. Additionally, adoption of a market-centered 
fair use analysis would cause the public to lose out on the benefits 
of thriving fair use defense, including increased innovation and the 
progress of culture. Under the foregoing approach, value-added 
uses that are still public and commercial in nature would often 
lose.155 
There was a time, in the period following the Supreme Court 
decision in Harper & Row,156 when the market-centered fair use 
inquiry dominated. This period, however, was marked by 
unpredictability and confusion over fair use—making it difficult to 
take advantage of the defense. Because there is a high cost of 
defending a claim of infringement in court and devastating liability 
if one incorrectly evaluates the outcome of a case, the ability to 
forecast outcomes to a certain extent is critical to a thriving fair use 
policy.157 
With the modern paradigm of transformative use, however, 
comes a doctrine that generates relatively predictable outcomes 
and is widely available. Accordingly, the circuits, including the 
Seventh Circuit, should follow the thriving transformative fair use 
jurisprudence that has been maintained since the Supreme Court 
decision in Campbell. There is no need for Congress to intervene 
                                                                                                             
154 See Leval, supra note 1, at 1110 (stating that the fair use doctrine 
protects secondary creativity as a legitimate concern of copyright). 
155 Leval, supra note 1, at 1125. 
156 See Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 
(1985) (“[T]his last factor is undoubtedly the single most important element of 
fair use.”). 
157 Marjorie Heins & Tricia Beckles, Will Fair Use Survive?, BRENNAN 
CTR. FOR JUSTICE 4 (Jan. 4, 2005), https://www.brennancenter.org/ 
sites/default/files/publications/Will%20Fair%20Use%20Survive.pdf. 
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in this circuit split; a strong fair use defense needs the ability to 
adapt to changing technology and times. Congress did not want to 
freeze fair use in 1976 by statute, but rather wanted the law to 
continue to adapt and evolve with the times.158 
The Supreme Court established the transformative use inquiry 
in Campbell, which the Seventh Circuit has seemingly ignored. It 
remains to be seen how other courts will react to Kienitz. However, 
it would be best practice for courts, including the Seventh Circuit, 




 The courts now focus on transformative use rather than 
inquiry into market harm when determining whether a use 
is fair. 
 
 In determining whether a use is transformative, courts 
inquire primarily into whether a use has a new purpose, not 
whether there has been literal alteration of a copyrighted 
work. 
 
 If it serves a new purpose, a use need not comment on an 
underlying work in order to be considered fair. 
  
                                                                                                             
158 See H.R. REP. 94–1476, 66 (1976) (“The bill endorses the purpose and 
general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to 
freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid 
technological change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair 
use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt 
the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.”). 
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